10(E) (November 2005): 42. The US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) should not engage in overt pro-US influence operations. Some features of WorldCat will not be available. Much of this Iranian content cannot be characterized as “disinformation.” In sharp contrast to the information operations of Russia, which routinely disseminate false stories with the aim of polluting the information environment, Iran makes less use of obvious falsehood. The Islamic Republic, buffeted by Western sanctions, international isolation, a hawkish Israel, and, of course, COVID-19, has lost considerable ground economically and militarily. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Iran maneuvered to ensure its agents of influence would be included in the Iraqi opposition that the United States would rely upon to form a new Iraqi government. Iran further dismissed new US sanctions, applied as part of a “maximum pressure” strategy, as tantamount to economic terrorism.16. Easier said than understood. If a determination is made that Iran’s foreign policy goals can be better achieved by President Trump’s electoral defeat, Iranian proxies are likely to mount efforts to that end. Different elements of Iran’s digital propaganda apparatus evidence the involvement of different government agencies. Source: Twitter, Yet, even with these tightening government controls, some fifty-six million Iranians—70 percent of the population—are now regular Internet users.63 Many banned services, like Facebook, still enjoy widespread domestic popularity, thanks to the evasion of Internet filters and toleration by some state enforcers (in 2017, there were still as many as forty million Iranian Facebook users).64 Today, the locus of Iranian digital life is the fashion-friendly Instagram (at least twenty-four million users) and the encrypted Telegram (at least forty million users, despite a limited ban).65 Yet, as the Iranian people have found new online refuges, authorities follow close behind. The first goal is the elimination of US military presence in the Middle East. The head of Iran’s state propaganda agency, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), is appointed by the theocratic supreme leader rather than Iran’s elected president or parliament.18Ibid. This is a result of the early integration of digital manipulation into Iranian government and military functions. This culminated in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address that named Iran to the “Axis of Evil” alongside Iraq and North Korea. An ostensibly independent media broadcaster is not the appropriate entity to conduct such programs. Gradually, however, Iran would impose severe limitations on digital communications. For the next twenty-six years, opposition parties ceased to operate and the media was strictly controlled. Facebook has further attributed forty-three Facebook events and $57,000 in advertising to Iranian actors. As focus on Iranian influence efforts has grown, however, so have misperceptions about the nature of these operations. The IUVM also offered links to dozens of “member” websites, all of which were clearing houses for Iranian propaganda.79In a “digital flex,” Iranians spammed the Instagram account of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in January 2019. This conception of “media war” is owed to the international broadcasts that have long composed a significant part of Iran’s media environment. Yet, the IRIB represents just one instrument of domestic influence. By tasking USAGM with “counterinfluence programs” against Iran in the fiscal year 2019 appropriations bill for the Department of State, Congress endangers both the editorial independence and effectiveness of the USAGM. “False Freedom: Online censorship in the Middle East and North Africa,” Human Rights Watch 17 no. Social media has fundamentally transformed the nature of foreign influence activities. These goals are closely tied to Iran’s geopolitical interests. Accordingly, Iran’s conventional military and IRGC planning emphasize informational control for both defense and offense. Jane Lytvynenko and Jeremy Singer-Vine, “A Pro-Iran Instagram Campaign Targeted The Trump Family After Soleimani’s Funeral,” Buzzfeed, January 8, 2020. It offered a line of associated properties: IUVMPress and IUVMTV, which functioned as news and video aggregators; IUVMApp, which offered “halal” smartphone games and Quranic education; and even IUVMPixel, which featured a range of anti-Saudi and anti-US comic strips. The fiscal year 2019 appropriations bill for the US Department of State expressly directed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to consult with the USAGM to coordinate “counterinfluence programs” against Iran.34. In contrast to similarly structured commercial content mills, none of these websites feature advertising. A similar nonpartisan organization already exists in the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol of the Canadian government.111. The agreement will reportedly include major infrastructure investments, increased defense and intelligence sharing, and a favored export market for Iranian oil. Iran sees itself as engaged in a perennial information war: against Sunni Arab powers, against the forces of perceived Western neocolonialism, and particularly against the United States. Other pages go to considerable lengths to cover their tracks. Today, it commands tens of thousands of them, waging an information war that shows no sign of ending. Indeed, Iran is clamouring to offer its side of the story, but how and when do these influence operations metamorphoise into disinformation-driven direct action remains an enigma. It is not clear how, or if, these agencies coordinate their operations. Instead, Iranian interference in US politics has almost exclusively taken the form of websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts that seek to redirect left-leaning causes to their own ends. “Iran Adopts Aggressive Approach Toward Enemies,” Tehran Times, July 18, 2011. By the mid-2000s, the US government was investing significant resources in Iran-targeted websites and Internet programming, while young Iranians gravitated to new Western social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter.50Izadi, “US International Broadcasting,” 143. For more information regarding the CTM, see Ben Nimmo, “Measuring Traffic Manipulation on Twitter,” Project on Computational Propaganda, University of Oxford, Working Paper 2019.1. The Palm Oil Conundrum in EU-ASEAN Relations. But, whereas Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns are intended to obfuscate truth and discredit Western institutions, Iran’s efforts exemplify the art of indirect “Persian persuasion” and deflection. This “halal” digital ecosystem, free from foreign websites and influence, would allow complete awareness of all Internet traffic in the country—and total control over user data and speech. This scale of foreign broadcasting significantly increased following the US invasion of Iraq.26Linda Robinson et al. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4644398.stm, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/29/us_sponsors_anonymiser_if_you/, https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-03-07/supreme-council-cyberspace-new-online-oversight-agency-launch-iran, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/05/29/How-to-define-Iran-s-Hassan-Rouhani-as-a-moderate-.html, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/irans-revolutionary-guard-targets-450-social-media-users/, https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38315/The-National-Internet-AR-KA-final.pdf, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-says-its-intranet-almost-ready-to-shield-country-from-harmful-Internet/29952836.html, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/19/780713507/higher-gasoline-prices-in-iran-fuel-demonstrations, https://netblocks.org/reports/Internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-fuel-protests-in-multiple-cities-pA25L18b, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/18/middleeast/iran-protests-explained-intl/index.html, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR, https://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm, https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/forget-telegram-iranians-are-using-instagram-to-shop/, https://www.superception.fr/en/2013/10/06/twitter-revolutionizes-international-relations/, https://time.com/3618706/iran-ferguson-u-s-twitter/, https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/slate-publishes-puff-piece-on-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-calls-him-a-lovable-twitter-rascal, https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-politicians-twitter-ban/28701701.html, https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-an-iranian-messaging-laundromat-218c46509193, https://web.archive.org/web/20120801000000*/ http://awdnews.com/, https://web.archive.org/web/20170529205709/ http://iuvm.org/en/about/, https://web.archive.org/web/20141225232542/ http://iuvm.org/members, https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-spam-attack-on-secretary-pompeo-d2ab638f0b5e, https://medium.com/dfrlab/tensions-escalate-on-social-media-platforms-after-soleimanis-death-48f295ecec5e, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/janelytvynenko/iran-instagram-trump-campaign, https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-dismantled-iranian-influence-operation-e7ff859763a8, https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-iran-based-assets-again-f17358ef21f, https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28745990, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-iran-exclusive/trump-re-election-campaign-targeted-by-iran-linked-hackers-sources-idUSKBN1WJ1ZM, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/technology/iranian-campaign-hackers-microsoft.html, https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-iranian-assets-some-targeting-latin-american-audiences-58a964dc0597, https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-a-political-astroturfing-app-coordinates-pro-israel-influence-operations-bf1104fa5c7f, https://medium.com/dfrlab/royally-removed-facebook-takes-down-pages-promoting-saudi-interests-edc0ce8b972a, https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-disabled-assets-linked-to-egypt-and-uae-based-firms-a232d9effc32, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200p610, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/beyond-control-iran-and-its-opponents-locked-in-a-lopsided-confrontation/, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm541, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/10/tech/instagram-iran-soleimani-posts/index.html, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/04/canada-foreign-election-meddling-1698209, Silicon Valley preaches diversity and inclusion while excluding Iranians, Iranians fear a permanent internet blackout is in the making, EXPLORE THE Atlantic Council’s Middle East PROGRAMs, Policy on donor acceptance and disclosure.
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